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Abstract
This paper conducts an empirical analysis of the determinants
of airline alliances. Well established airlines with large passengers’
volumes are more likely to participate in an alliance and are also es-
sential for alliance survivability. In line with this …nding, older air-
lines have a higher probability of being part of an alliance. Airlines
operating with high load factors consider alliance participation as a
signi…cant alternative to ‡eet capacity expansion. As their market
share grows, alliances become more appealing to airlines. Competit-
ors’ decision to enter an alliance tends to have a positive impact on
alliance participation. The relatively similar magnitude and e¤ect of
the regressors’ coe¢cients across di¤erent alliance choices, suggests
that the airline’s major decision is not to choose a speci…c alliance,
but rather considering whether to enter into an alliance, as a possible
strategy within its business model.
JEL Classi…cation: C23, L10, L93.
Keywords: Discrete choice model, Oneworld, Sky Team, Star Alli-
ance.
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11 Introduction
Airline alliances began in the 1990s, but have experienced most of their ex-
pansion in the last …ve to eight years. The three current global alliances,
Oneworld, Sky Team and Star Alliance, account for more than two-thirds of
the entire industry capacity. Of the world’s top 20 airlines, only two carriers,
Southwest Airlines and Ryanair, are not a¢liated to any alliance. The phe-
nomenon of airline alliances is however industry pervasive, since Oneworld,
Sky Team and Star Alliance also include several minor airlines among their
members. Moreover, additional minor carriers will join one of these alliances
in the near future.1
As they continue to expand, alliances eventually tend to include mem-
bers which are actual or potential competitors. There are several aspects of
competition involved, as airline alliances a¤ect factors such as: fares, airport
facilities, frequent ‡yer programs, ‡ight schedule, ‡ight frequency, etc. Their
potential to have negative implications for both the industry and consumers
alike have always concerned competition authorities over the globe.2
From the perspective of the airline, participating in an alliance might be
bene…cial for several reasons. Firstly, alliances allow to extend the network
and reduce costs, by exploiting economies of scale and density. Secondly, and
more importantly, an alliance might be a useful way to test for compatibility
among members, which could lead to tighter forms of cooperation such as
joint ventures, code-sharing,3 franchising, or even a merger. Indeed, alliances
often correspond to the engagement ring before the merger of two alliance
members, as shown by the following recent mergers: Air France-KLM in
2004, Delta-Northwest in 2008, not to mention the possibility of a future
merger between British Airways and Iberia.
Several economists4 have discussed the costs and bene…ts of airline al-
liances and hence the incentive to form an alliance in theory. However, to
the best of our knowledge, there does not exist any empirical investigation
1For instance, King…sher Airlines and S7 Airlines will join Oneworld; TAROM and
Vietnam Airlines will join Sky Team; Air India, Olympic Air and TAM Airlines will join
Star Alliance.
2The most relevant antitrust authorities are the Department of Transportation in the
United States and the European Commission, which collectively represents the countries
of the European Union.
3Bamberger et al (2004) o¤er a clear explanation of the way airline alliances split the
seats and revenues of a code-shared service.
4See Button et al (1998), Oum et al (2000), Pels (2001) for instance.
2of the determinants of airline alliances. The aim and contribution of this
paper are precisely to …ll this gap. We apply a discrete choice model on a
sample of the world’s major airlines observed over the past twenty years. We
control for airline and alliance speci…c characteristics, as well as for macroe-
conomic conditions. We …nd that well established airlines are more likely to
participate in an alliance rather than recently established airlines. As their
market shares continue to increase, alliances become more appealing to air-
lines. Competitors’ choice to enter an alliance tends to positively a¤ect the
observed airline’s decision to participate in an alliance in the future. Fur-
thermore, the key decision made by the airline is not about …nding the most
suitable alliance to meet the airline’s needs, since with their widespread route
network, all alliances may look equivalent in the eyes of the airline. Rather,
the key decision involves a choice of whether to adopt the alliance model as a
sustainable business strategy. In other words, the decision made by the air-
lines is whether or not to enter an alliance, but not which particular alliance
to enter.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. A description of airline al-
liances and their antitrust implications is o¤ered in the next section. Section
3 presents some theoretical considerations on airline alliances followed by the
speci…cation of the econometric model in section 4. Section 5 discusses the
results, which are checked for robustness in Section 6. Finally, concluding
remarks are made in Section 7.
2 Airline alliances
An alliance is a form of cooperation between two or more airlines with the
intention of enhancing the competitiveness and performance of its members.
Besides operating some ‡ight services in partnership, the cooperation may
consist in sharing operational facilities such as sales o¢ces, computer sys-
tems, catering; operational sta¤ such as ground handling personnel at check-
in and boarding desks; airport facilities such as aircraft parking, airport
lounges.
The world’s major airline alliances considered in our empirical analysis
are: KLM-Northwest (Wings), Quali‡yer, Oneworld, Sky Team and Star
Alliance. The …rst established form of cooperation among airlines began
in 1989 with the partnership between Northwest and KLM, which about
a decade later started to cooperate with Continental and Alitalia through
3code-sharing and frequent ‡yer program coordination. Although no formal
association was ever announced, these airlines were to form an alliance called
Wings. This proposed alliance, however, became super‡uous in 2004 when
all of its participants joined Sky Team.
Quali‡yer was created in 1992 by Austrian Airlines and Swissair, it rap-
idly expanded as new airlines joined (LOT, Sabena, TAP Portugal, Tuskish
Airlines), but it was dissolved after Swissair’s bankruptcy in 2002.
The remaining three alliances, Oneworld, Sky Team and Star Alliance,
are still active and therefore will probably represent the main set of alliance
alternatives for non-member airlines in the future. Star Alliance is the alli-
ance with the largest number of members, whilst Oneworld and Sky Team
have similar dimensions in terms of members. Star Alliance was founded
by Air Canada, Lufthansa, SAS, Thai Airways and United Airlines in 1997;
Oneworld was founded by American Airlines, British Airways, Canadian Air-
lines, Cathay Paci…c and Qantas in 1999; and Sky Team was founded by
Aeroméxico, Air France, Delta Air Lines, and Korean Air in 2000.
Table 1 lists the members of each alliance, together with the year of entry




Two important features of airline alliances can be deduced from the table.
First, apart from the obvious cases related to Quali‡yer’s extinction and to
KLM-Northwest members joining Sky Team, airlines generally remain in an
alliance, once they are a¢liated to it. There have been very few cases of air-
lines switching alliances. We observe only three examples of airlines switching
alliances in our data set: Continental, which moved from Sky Team to Star
Alliance in 2009; Canadian Airlines, which, after being incorporated into Air
Canada, left Oneworld to join Air Canada’s alliance in 2000, Star Alliance;
and Mexicana, which quitted Star Alliance in 2004 to pursue more e¤ective
code-sharing relationships with other airlines and then joined Oneworld few
years later. Excluding Quali‡yer and KLM-Northwest from the analysis, the
remaining cases of alliance exit (Ansett Australia and Varig, both leaving
Star Alliance) are associated with the airline’s bankruptcy and thus do not
represent examples of alliance switches.
The second important feature deduced from table 1 is that three out of
four cases of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) - not to count the possible
future merger between British Airways and Iberia - occur between airlines
4a¢liated to the same alliance5 and thus show that airline alliances often
represent the most common prelude to M&A.
Under the competition policy perspective, M&A represents one of the
main source of concern, because of their potential negative impact on con-
sumers’ surplus. Also the mere alliance between airlines, could have a negat-
ive impact on consumers’ welfare, though. For instance, the alliance between
two carriers operating overlapping routes, can simply results in cooperatively
setting higher fares.
For this reasons, the possibility to closely coordinate fares among alliance
members is subject to antitrust immunity, which is granted by the compet-
ition authorities of the countries where they operate, after an assessment
of the welfare impact of such cooperation. To illustrate the implications of
antitrust immunity, let us consider the route New York - London served by
American Airlines and British Airways. These two Oneworld members ob-
tained antitrust immunity by the US Department of Transportation and by
the European Commission in July 2010. Before antitrust immunity Amer-
ican Airlines (British Airways) operated the ‡ight service New York - London
only hoping to have enough feed from its New York (London) hub and from
British Airways’ (American Airlines’) code-shared passengers; and that was
all. Under antitrust immunity, instead, American Airlines and British Air-
ways can work directly to coordinate schedules and set fares. In other words,
they can now jointly look at how much tra¢c they are taking over all their
hubs and decide for their best.6
Antitrust immunity is often obtained after a long bargaining process
between airlines on one side and the antitrust body on the other side. The
negotiations often conclude with member airlines relinquishing some take-o¤
and landing slots on selected routes to allow new ‡ight services by “true”
competitors (i.e., non-members of the alliance under analysis), necessary to
guarantee some extent of genuine competition. For instance, the antitrust
5The only case of inter-alliance M&A is the acquisition of Canadian Airlines by Air
Canada, the other three cases (Air France-KLM, Delta-Northwest, Continental-United)
all concern intra-alliance members.
6The schedule coordination policy, for instance, is evident if we consider the current
winter schedule Los Angeles to Europe of the Star Alliance members Lufthansa, Swiss
International and United Airlines, which have been granted antitrust immunity for several
years. Lufthansa ‡ies to Frankfurt at 3 pm and to Munich at 9 pm; Swiss International
‡ies to Zurich at 7.20 pm; United ‡ies to London at 5 pm. It is clear that these airlines
coordinate their ‡ights to Europe throughout the whole afternoon, so that passengers
connecting beyond their hubs can choose among di¤erent departure time options.
5immunity obtained by American Airlines and British Airways in July 2010
has been granted by the European Commission only after the surrender of
some slots at London Heathrow and London Gatwick airports for ‡ights to
Boston, Dallas, Miami, New York and after the promise of making available
slots at New York JFK airport for services to London in the future if deemed
necessary.
3 Why alliances? Some theoretical consider-
ations
Most of the theoretical contributions regarding airline alliances focus on their
impact on consumers’ welfare and the importance of antitrust immunity,
taking the alliance structure as given (see Park (1997) and Brueckner, 2003).
For instance, Brueckner (2001) considers a model with two carriers that serve
remote locations and two hubs. Without any alliance, the two carriers are
competitors in the segment between the two hubs, while they are monopolists
in the remote areas. In this case the author shows that alliance formation
reduces competition between the two hubs, so that the price is higher, but
for long distance ‡ights (i.e., from remote to remote areas) the total price is
lower. Since the alliance structure is taken as given, the incentives to form
such alliance are not investigated.
In general, the bene…ts to form an alliance are: a lager network realized
by the joint route map of every member and cost reductions by sharing op-
erational facilities (e.g., sales o¢ces, computer systems and catering), opera-
tional sta¤ (e.g., ground handling personnel at check-in and boarding desks),
airport facilities (e.g., aircraft parking, airport lounges). Caves et al. (1984)
introduce the distinction between returns to density and returns to scale: the
former are the reduction of unit costs due to the increase of the magnitude
of passengers (or merchandize) for a given network size, while the latter are
the proportional increase in both network size and services o¤ered. They
…nd statistical evidence only in favor of returns to density, while returns to
scale seems to remain constant. In line with those …ndings, Brueckner and
Whalen (2000) propose a model in which the advantage of alliances comes
from the internalization of the negative externality that arises when setting
fares non-cooperatively; this internalization allows the alliance to set lower
fares, thus attracting more costumers, and the economies of density allow for
6a reduction of the unit costs. Therefore, forming an alliance allows to better
exploit the economies of density.
It is not clear, however, why some airline do not enter any alliance. There
might be some costs associated with the formation of alliances. Flores-Fillon
and Moner-Colonques (2007) consider an environment similar to Brueckner
and Whalen (2000), where the formation of an alliance allows to internalize
the price …xing externality on long distance ‡ights, which, in turn, allows
to attract more passengers and, consequently, exploit the return of density.7
They show the existence of asymmetric equilibria, in which only some com-
panies decide to form an alliance, while others prefer to remain independent.
The intuition behind this result lies on the fact that with more alliances the
competition to attract passengers, in order to exploit the return of density,
is tougher, leading to lower pro…ts. Therefore, the reaction of some carriers
to the formation of an alliance might be to remain independent. For this res-
ult to emerge we need a certain degree of market power by the independent
…rms, so that if the formation of an alliance does not hinder too much this
market power, the company may prefer to remain independent.
The key element that seems to distinguish airline alliances from the form-
ation of cartels is the segmentation of the market in short and long distance
‡ights. Therefore, the formation of alliance depends on the economic con-
ditions in both markets. The e¤ect underlined by Flores-Fillon and Moner-
Colonques (2007) may disappear as competition is introduced in the local
market, making the formation of alliances a good strategy to face the in-
creased competition in the domestic market.
The theoretical approach seems to predict that the probability to be part
of an alliance would depend on the possibility to exploit the returns to density.
The higher those returns, the larger the incentive to create or join an alliance.
Moreover, the competition in the market also plays a crucial role. For this
reason our empirical strategy focuses on the following two dimensions:
￿ company and alliances’ size
￿ degree of competition
The …rst dimension should capture the possibility to exploit the returns
of density, while the second dimension should shed some light on the way
in which competition a¤ects the incentives to form an alliance. We would
7See also Flores-Fillol (2009).
7expect a positive impact of variables linked with size, such as the number of
passengers, the load factor, and the alliances’ market share.
The theoretical literature suggests that an increase in competition among
alliances should reduce the incentive to form an alliance, while the increase
in competition faced by the single airline should push toward the alliance
strategy. In this case, a potential prisoner’s dilemma type of problem may
arise, were the singleton strategy more pro…table than the equilibriumstrategy
(where some alliances have formed). Empirically we cannot distinguish between
the two forms of competition, however, we can consider Alliance pressure,
that is, the number of airlines that joined a network in the previous period,
as a measure of the pressure to join an airline given that other airlines have
already joined. Moreover, we can consider National carriers’ tra¢c, that
is the total number of passengers carrier by national airlines as an indirect
measure of the potential market power of the airline in its national market,
which is less in‡uenced by the formation of the alliance. Therefore a positive
sign on Alliance pressure would suggest a strong competition faced by single
airlines toward the airlines in the alliance, and a negative sign on National
carriers’ tra¢c would suggest that the larger market for national carriers,
the less the company is a¤ected by the alliances’ competition, because the
airline can turn to the domestic market where the advantages of the alliance
are limited.
Finally, it is worth noting that our empirical analysis does not distinguish
between the creation of an alliance and joining an existing alliance. This is
an important topic that necessitate the construction of a dynamic model of
alliance formation, where it is possible to disentangle the incentives to create
a new alliance from the incentives to join an existing one. We leave this for
future research.
84 Empirical speci…cation
The econometric model of this paper is represented by the following equation.
Alliance_choiceit 8
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(1)
Time t is set yearly, i characterizes the airline. The dependent vari-
able, Alliance choice, represents the airline’s choice among di¤erent alliances.
There are six alternative alliances, namely the …ve alliances previously men-
tioned in table 1 (KLM-Northwest, Oneworld, Quali‡yer, Sky Team and Star
Alliance), plus the counterfactual “No-alliance” if the observed airline does
not participate in any alliance during the observed year. Table 2 provides




No-alliance is the most frequent observation, representing over 50% of
the sample of airline alliances. Its high frequency is because several airlines
join the alliance later on during the sample period8 and because the sample
comprises airlines which are not members of any alliances.9 For ease of
comparison, we set the No-alliance category as the reference group in the
econometric estimations. Thus, we will estimate the probability of joining
an alliance with respect to not participating in any alliance.
The independent variables consist of three categories capturing airline
characteristics (denoted by ￿ parameters in equation 1), alliance charac-
teristics (￿ parameters) and country characteristics (￿ parameters). More
speci…cally:
￿ Passengers is the total number of passengers in millions carried by
the observed airline in a given year. This variable aims to capture
8See table 1 for several examples.
9For instance Emirates, Easyjet, Ryanair and Southwest Airlines.
9the absolute size of the airline. In principles the e¤ect of Passengers
on alliance participation can be ambiguous. On one hand, airlines
characterized by a large tra¢c volumes have already their own extended
network and thus have less need to join an alliance. On the other hand,
they are well established on the market and thus they may be willing
to enter or even form an alliance in order to seek further development
and market expansion. Given that the alliances of this sample count
di¤erent big airlines among their founding members, we expect the
latter e¤ect to prevail over the former e¤ect.
￿ Load factor is the average load factor of the observed airline in a give
year. This variable should control for possible capacity constraints and
their implications in favor of alliance participation.
￿ International business is the ratio of the revenues originating from in-
ternational passengers over the total passengers’ revenues. It captures
the importance of international business for the observed airline. We
expect larger share of international business to be associated with a
positive alliance participation, since member airlines can bene…t from
the international route network o¤ered by the alliance.
￿ Years in business is the elapsed years since airline’s foundation and
controls for the di¤erent length of the operating period of di¤erent
airlines. We presume older airlines to be more likely to participate in
an alliance because they are better consolidated on the market and
thus more inclined to take a further step in their development process,
which consists in joining an alliance.
￿ Alliance pressure is the total number of airlines entering any alliance
during the previous year. It aims to control for the indirect pressure
to which an airline is subject whenever it observes several competitors
joining an alliance. Thus a larger amount of Alliance pressure is ex-
pected to have a positive impact on the observed airline’s likelihood of
entering an alliance.
￿ Alliances’ market share is the world’s market share of the airline alli-
ances. It controls for the overall e¤ect of the alliance phenomenon in the
airline industry; therefore a larger market share should be associated
with a broader alliance participation.
10￿ National carriers’ tra¢c is the total number of passengers (domestic
and international) in millions carried by all the airlines registered in a
given country. It aims to capture the market size for national carriers.
In principles a larger market for national carriers should imply less
need for alliance membership, since the relative larger importance of
domestic market overcomes the small potentials of international market
expansion due to alliance participation.
￿ Capita GDP is the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita of the
country in which the observed airline is registered. The unit is thou-
sands U$, it aims to control for the economic fundamentals of the coun-
try in which the airline is based.
￿ Country represents two dummy variables, one for airlines registered in
Europe and one for airlines registered in the United States. It aims to
control for some important country-speci…c e¤ects, typically antitrust
concerns: for instance, US carriers might consider domestic antitrust re-
percussions when deciding whether to enter into a partnership.10 Note
that European carriers are represented by one single European dummy
rather than by a set of country dummies, because antitrust cases in
Europe are assessed at European level by the European Commission in
Brussels.11
￿ " is the random term, assumed with zero mean.
A brief description of the sample and of the data sources is provided in
the appendix.
5 Results
The results from estimating our model as multinomial logit are reported in
Table 3. The Hausman test of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternative
(IIA)12 strongly supports the IIA hypothesis, hence, the estimates of the
10We are grateful to one anonymous referee for giving us this suggestion.
11A relatively recent airline antitrust case assessed by the European Commission is for
instance the blocked merger between Aer Lingus and Ryanair in June 2007. For further
discussions on this topic see Gaggero and Piga (2010).
12See Hausman and McFadden (1984) or Train (2003).
11multinomial logit model are not undermined. Standard errors are clustered
by the pair country-year, to control for possible correlation, within the same
year, between the residuals of di¤erent airlines registered in the same coun-
try.13
Note that the whole econometric analysis does not report the estimates
relative to KLM-Northwest and Quali‡ier. The reason is not merely to save
space, but also because these two alliances have a poor current interest due to
the fact that Quali‡ier has ceased its operations in 2002 and that the KLM-
Northwest cooperation has become super‡uous since its founding members
have joined Sky Team in 2004. Thus, the focus of the discussion will be
on the three active alliances: Oneworld, Sky Team and Star Alliance, which





The positive sign on Passengers implies that airlines characterized by
high tra¢c volumes are more likely to participate in an alliance. “Big”airlines
(i.e., well established and with large passengers’ volumes) are welcome in any
alliance as they normally have a large route network, which they bring into
the alliance as a valuable asset, because it allows to better exploit the eco-
nomies of density. Indeed the participation of several big carriers as founding
members of an airline alliance is probably a key factor in the survival of the
alliance itself. As shown in Table 1, all the three active alliances include more
than one big carrier among their founding members: for instance America
Airlines and British Airways for Oneworld, Air France and Delta Airlines
for Sky Team, Lufthansa and United Airlines for Star Alliance. On the con-
trary, the establishment of Quali‡ier involved only one distinguished airline,
namely Swissair. The alliance was too dependent on Swissair, thus, when
airline became bankrupt, Quali‡ier also broke down. Even if Quali‡ier star-
ted its operations before Oneworld, Sky Team and Star Alliances, it was too
reliant on a particular airline and hence its destiny appeared doomed from
the beginning.
When an airline operates near its full ‡eet capacity (high Load factor),
13Examples of country-year-speci…c shocks may be a change in politics (elections, legis-
lative national reforms in the airline sector, etc.) or a change in the economy (negative
shock on …nancial markets, country entering the recession, September 11th, etc).
12it has a positive probability to become a member of an airline alliance. This
result shows the importance of the returns of density on the formation of
alliances. Moreover, forming an alliance may represent an alternative way of
expanding ‡eet capacity, in particular for airlines lacking …nancial resources
and/or unwilling to bear the risk of increasing their ‡eet.14
The positive and statistically signi…cant coe¢cient on Alliances’ market
share is in line with the assumption that alliances become more appealing as
they grow in market power.
These three variables - Passengers, Load factor and Alliances’ market
share - show that the returns to density play a crucial role as one of the main
determinants for airline alliances.
As regards the role of competition, Alliance pressure has a positive impact
on the probability of forming an alliance, while National carriers’ tra¢c has a
negative impact. This …nding suggests that the incentive to form an alliance
to face the competition of airlines that already formed (Alliance pressure),
is hindered by the market power in the domestic market.
The positive sign on Alliance pressure could be explained by the following
argument: the larger the number of airlines entering the alliances’ business,
the higher the threat that the alliance network would become saturated and
hence that the marginal bene…t to the alliance from the entry of the observed
airline would be minimal.15 Therefore, due to the fear of remaining excluded
from any alliance in the future, the observed airline has a greater incentive
to join the alliance as the number of non-alliance members shrink.
The variable National carriers’ tra¢c represents the size of the market
for nationally registered carriers.16 Should such a market be large, a given
national airline may wish to exploit it with no need for the international
network o¤ered by any alliance. For this reason, the impact of National
carriers’ tra¢c on the likelihood of participating in an airline alliance is
negative. Note that this result can be read together with the …nding of the
positive, although insigni…cant, sign on International business: if there is
some potential for national business expansion, the bene…ts of participating
14Expanding the ‡eet involves high sunk costs and high operating costs. Participating
in an alliance and code-sharing members’ aircraft zero those costs and the associated risk
of their recovery.
15See Agusdinata and de Klein (2002).
16Note that the inclusion of the dummy variables for Europe and for the United States
aims to control for the overall country-e¤ect, whilst National carriers’ tra¢c should cap-
ture the genuine e¤ect of the national market size.
13an alliance are minimal. On the contrary, if the airline has an international
orientation, then joining an alliance becomes a priority.
Although statistically insigni…cant17 from zero, International business has
the correct, positive sign and thus does not deny the presumption that a
larger proportion of international business requires alliance participation in
order to take advantage of the international route network of the members.
The elapsed number of years since a company’s foundation, Years in
business, has a positive and statistically signi…cant impact on the probability
of joining an alliance across all the three alliances. This result is in line with
the idea that older airlines are better consolidated in the market and are thus
ready to take a further step in their development process, which consists in
joining an alliance. Furthermore it could be argued that the longer the
company has been on the market, the more likely it establishes a reliable
reputation, which, on the contrary, is less likely to be observed in younger
companies. If the prospective member has a good reputation, it speeds up
the steps of entering an alliance, since airline alliances, as any other form of
coalition, are the result of a negotiation process.
Except for the estimates relative to Sky Team with a weak level of stat-
istically signi…cance (i.e., insigni…cant below 5% level), the Gross Domestic
Product per capita, Capita GDP, is positive and highly statistically signi…c-
ant (i.e., beyond the threshold of 1% level). The variable itself has no speci…c
meaning in terms of alliance determinant, but captures the country speci…c,
macroeconomic e¤ects in‡uencing the demand of air travel and thus it indir-
ectly a¤ects airlines’ business and behavior.18 Yet, to give an interpretation
to the estimates, the two positive and highly statistically signi…cant coe¢-
cients on Capita GDP may indicate that richer countries, which are possibly
associated with well established airlines, are generally more likely to have
more alliance members.
Finally, from a general overview of the results, we observe a very interest-
ing pattern in the estimates. Table 4 reformulates the coe¢cients of Table 3
17We acknowledge that International business might not be too accurate in its purpose
because on one hand some countries (typically European countries) are so small that all
airline’s tra¢c can be classi…ed as international, whilst on the other hand some countries
(typically the United States) comprise a domestic market so large that even a substantial
international tra¢c by an airline does not suggest that the airline is active in the inter-
national arena. Nevertheless, the inclusion of two dummy variables - one for Europe and
one for the United States - in the regressions should purge part of this imperfection.
18See Brueckner and Spiller (1994), Park and Zhang (2000).
14in terms of relative risk ratio,19 which is de…ned as the ratio of the probability
of choosing one outcome category over the probability of choosing the refer-
ence category. Comparing the relative risk ratios across the three di¤erent
alliance choices, we notice that their magnitude is quite similar, especially
if we restrict the analysis to only those statistically signi…cant values. This
result means that the probability of entering a given alliance over the prob-
ability of not participating in any alliance does not ‡uctuate much across
di¤erent alliances. In other words, the airlines view the di¤erent alliance
groups as similar. Thus the main decision for the airline is not to choose
a speci…c alliance, but rather to consider whether or not to enter an airline





Using a multinomial logit model we …nd that the probability of participating
in an airline alliance can be explained by looking at di¤erent points of view.
From an airline perspective, the size and the age of the airline increase the
likelihood of membership. Focusing on competitors’ behavior, the decision
by other carriers to enter an alliance pressurizes the observed airline to join
an alliance sooner rather than later. From an alliance perspective, the recent
expansion of airline alliances in the world market induces many carriers to
apply for membership, but if the market of national carriers is large enough,
the need for an alliance fades. Finally, the relative risk ratio analysis suggests
that the main decision for an airline does not consist in which alliance to
choose, but rather on whether to join any alliance.
This section tests the validity of the above results by performing the
following robustness checks.
1. Generalize alliance choice as a binary rather than multinomial choice
and estimate the model with logit.
2. Estimate the model with nested logit as an alternative to multinomial
logit.
19Recall that the relative risk ratio is simply calculated by taking the exponential of the
multinomial logit estimate.
153. Control for possible endogeneity using instrumental variables.
6.1 Logit
Following up from the key conclusion of the multinomial logit analysis, which
suggests that the main choice of the airline is whether to be in or out of an
alliance, rather than on the choice of a speci…c alliance, we re-consider the
alliance decision as a binary choice: Alliance versus No-alliance. That is, the
dependent variable is now a dummy variable equal to one if the observed
airline is a member of any airline alliance and equal to zero otherwise.
We therefore estimate the logit model,20 whose results are reported in the
second column of table 5. The sign and level of signi…cance of the coe¢cients
con…rm the results of the previous tables. Larger and older airlines are more
likely to be alliance members (positive sign respectively on Passengers and
Years in business); competitors’ choice to enter an alliance has a positive
e¤ect on observed airline’s alliance decision (positive sign on Alliance pres-
sure); as alliances consolidate on the market, they recruit more members
(positive sign on Alliances’ market share); a larger market for national car-
riers has a negative e¤ect on the probability of joining an alliance (negative





As a further and alternative way of modeling the fact that each airline gen-
erally chooses whether or not to enter into an alliance and the choice of a
speci…c partnership is conditional on the carrier having chosen to enter into
the alliance, we re-consider alliance participation in terms of a nested logit
model. The decisional tree is now formed by two main branches: Alliance and
No-alliance, with the former branch splitting into …ve …nal twigs representing
the …ve alliance alternatives previously mentioned.
20As further robustness checks we have also considered the probit and multinomial probit
models respectively in lieu of the logit model of table 5 and multinomial logit model of
table 3. The main conclusions remain unaltered. The results are not reported to save
space and are available upon request.
16The nested logit estimates are reported in the third column of table 5 and
are overall in line with the results discussed previously. Passengers and Load
factor remain highly statistically signi…cant and with their correct, positive
sign. As in the previous estimates, International business is insigni…cant
in statistical terms, but with the correct, positive sign. The high statistic-
ally signi…cant level of Year in business con…rms the idea that older airlines
can take advantage of their consolidated position on the market - possibly by
holding a well established reputation - and thus enter an alliance more easily.
Alliance pressure is statistically insigni…cant but positive, thus it may still
weakly support the presumption that, although the airline industry is char-
acterized by a large number of carriers, the conduct of few airlines may have
an impact on the behavior of the observed carrier. Alliances’ market share
has its correct, positive sign, even though it looses its level of statistically
signi…cance. The negative and statistically signi…cant coe¢cient on National
carriers’ tra¢c con…rms the thesis that a larger market for national carriers
may induce the national airline to stay out of an alliance, since alliances are
normally unnecessary when the airline wishes to expand its national network.
The positive and statistically signi…cant sign on Capita GDP supports the
idea that richer countries are associated with a broader alliance participation
of their carriers.
Finally and perhaps more importantly, except for the cases of Alliance
market share and Alliance pressure, the estimated coe¢cients of the nested
logit model are similar in terms of magnitude and signi…cance level to the
estimated coe¢cients of the logit model. Therefore the combined reading of
the logit and nested logit results seems to lend support to the aforementioned
idea that airline’s main decision in terms of alliance participation is to be in
or out an alliance, rather than to choose a speci…c alliance.
6.3 Instrumental Variables
Because alliance members may take advantage of the alliance route network
to expand their tra¢c, our estimates could su¤er from the endogeneity bias.
In other words, together with the model’s causal relation of a larger volume of
passengers implying a higher likelihood of alliance participation, it may also
occur the reverse causation of alliance participation increasing the number of
passengers. By the same token, because it is a function of passengers, load
factor may be also considered endogenous. Finally, for the presumption that
alliance participation boosts airline business, alliances’ market share may be
17endogenously determined.
If this were the case, then our previous estimates would be biased and
an instrumental variable approach required. From an econometric point of
view, however, the aforementioned simultaneity may be weak, because it usu-
ally requires some time before the alliance participation would boost tra¢c,
hence in principle passengers, load factor and market share would not be
simultaneously determined with alliance participation. Indeed the Wald test
of exogeneity21 does not reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity with a ￿2
equal to 1:52 and a corresponding p-value of 0:47. Thus the potential en-
dogeneity of Passengers, Load factor and Alliances’ market share may not
represent a big concern in this sample.
Nevertheless, the last column of table 5 reports the results of the instru-
mental variable analysis. We use di¤erent instruments to control for the
di¤erent aspects of the potential endogeneity bias. Our set of instruments
includes: the population of the country in which the airline is registered,
to capture the whole market’s size e¤ect; the growth rate of population, to
control for the potential expansion of the demand; the percentage of pop-
ulation between 15 and 64 years old, to represent the percentage of people
more likely to demand for air travel; the average exchange rate of the local
currency of the country of airline registration versus the dollar, to control
for possible cost-shifter - e.g., the price of kerosene - that may in‡uence the
market shares.22
Acknowledging that some variables loose their level of signi…cance in stat-
istical terms, all the regressors maintain the sign of the previous estimates
and therefore their directional e¤ect on alliance participation remains un-
altered. In other words the main conclusions of the analysis carried in the
previous section can be retained.
21Recall that the Wald test of exogeneity is a test of joint correlation between the error
terms in the structural equation (second stage) and those in the reduced-form equation
(…rst stage) for the endogenous variable. The residuals from the …rst stage are included as
regressors in the second stage, the two-step estimator. If those residuals are statistically
signi…cant from zero the null hypothesis (exogeneity) is rejected and the estimates of
the ordinary probit model are biased; on the contrary if those residuals are statistically
signi…cant from zero the null hypothesis (exogeneity) is not rejected and the ordinary
probit model is su¢cient. See Wooldridge (2002).
22For further discussions on the instruments see Gaggero and Piga (forthcoming).
187 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied empirically the determinants of airline alliances
applying a discrete choice model approach to a sample of 60 airlines observed
from late 1980s until 2008. We have implemented di¤erent model speci…c-
ations and di¤erent estimation techniques, including instrumental variables.
The results of the empirical analysis support the idea that one of the main
factors in‡uencing the formation of airline alliances is the possibility to ex-
ploit returns to density. The e¤ect of the number of passengers, of the load
factor, and of the alliances’ market share are all positive and signi…cant.
Moreover, our results seem to suggest a separation between the long and
short distance markets, as alliances’ competition puts a lower pressure on
airlines that are mainly focused on the domestic market.
Of course, other factors may in‡uence the formation of alliances. For
instance, we have found that older airlines are better consolidated on the
market and thus more inclined to take a further step in their development
process, which consists of joining an alliance.
Finally, and more importantly, the same sign and similar magnitude of the
regressors across di¤erent alliance alternatives, as indicated by the relative
risk ratio analysis, suggest that the airlines’ major decision is not to chose a
speci…c alliance, but rather to consider whether or not to enter into an airline
alliance as a viable strategy option.
Thus, we conclude that the airline industry is now characterized by car-
riers adopting one of two mutually exclusive strategies: airlines either follow
the modern Low Cost Carrier model and hence ignore any form of alliance,
focusing on the short-haul domestic market, or they adopt the traditional Full
Service Carrier model, in which alliance participation will probably become
a key factor for airline future survivability.
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21Appendix: the data set
The sample of this empirical analysis covers the world’s main airlines and
includes, besides the carriers listed in table 1, also the major airlines which
have never been a member of any alliances, such as Emirates, Easyjet, Ry-
anair and Southwest Airlines. The total number of carriers comprised in the
sample is 60. The sample period technically spans from 1989 to 2008, but,
because of initial less frequent observations, the core of the sample period
ranges from the middle of the 1990s to 2008. Note also that, as shown in
table 1, the three currently active alliances (i.e., Oneworld, Sky Team and
Star Alliance), which represent the major focus of our empirical analysis, are
formed at the end of the 1990s and therefore our estimation period fully cov-
ers both their pre-alliance formation period and their post-alliance formation
period.
Data are collected from two di¤erent sources: airlines’ annual reports
and the World Bank. Airlines’ annual reports are the major source to gather
speci…c information on each airline (passenger tra¢c, load factor, foundation
year, etc.), as well as general information on alliances (world’s market share,
list of participating carriers, entry and exit of members, etc.).
The World Bank Development Indicators database contains several mac-
roeconomic variables, such as the exchange rate, the Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) and its di¤erent speci…cations (GDP per capita among others), pop-
ulation, growth rate of population and population in age classes, as well as
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































23Table 2: Frequency of airline alliances in the sample
Alliance Frequency Percent
No allliance 398 50.73
KLM-Northwest (Wings) 18 2.40
Oneworld 85 11.35
Quali‡yer 21 2.80
Sky Team 67 8.95
Star Alliance 178 23.77
24Table 3: The determinants of airline alliances - Multinomial Logit Estimation
Alliance choice
Oneworld Sky Team Star Alliance
Passengers 0.030** 0.054*** 0.029***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.007)
Load factor 0.259*** 0.297*** 0.143***
(0.055) (0.060) (0.053)
International business 1.980 0.509 1.421
(1.268) (1.831) (1.025)
Years in business 0.052*** 0.058*** 0.026**
(0.014) (0.015) (0.013)
Alliance pressure 0.092* 0.010 0.053
(0.051) (0.057) (0.040)
Alliances’ market share 0.071*** 0.049*** 0.048***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.010)
National carriers’ tra¢c -0.014*** -0.004 -0.012***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Capita GDP 0.076*** -0.042* 0.079***
(0.021) (0.022) (0.023)
Observations = 377
Dependent variable: Alliance choice, No-alliance is the omitted category.
Europe and US dummies included, but not reported.
Robust standard errors to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation in parenthesis, clustered
by country of airline’s registration and by year.
Coe¢cients *** statistically signi…cant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%.
25Table 4: Relative Risk Ratios of Table 3
Alliance choice
Oneworld Sky Team Star Alliance
Passengers 1.031** 1.056*** 1.029***
Load factor 1.296*** 1.346*** 1.153***
International business 7.245 1.663 4.14
Years in business 1.053*** 1.060*** 1.026**
Alliance pressure 1.097* 1.01 1.054
Alliances’ market share 1.074*** 1.050*** 1.049***
National carriers’ tra¢c 0.986*** 0.996 0.988***
Capita GDP 1.079*** 0.959* 1.082***
Relative Risk Ratio = Probability(Observed alliance)/Probability(No-alliance).
Coe¢cients *** statistically signi…cant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%.
26Table 5: Logit, Nested Logit and Instrumental Variable (IV) Estimation
Logit Nested Logit IV
Passengers 0.034*** 0.038*** 0.019
(0.008) (0.007) (0.066)
Load factor 0.189*** 0.148*** 0.147
(0.048) (0.055) (0.117)
International business 0.787 0.808 0.480
(0.977) (1.089) (1.004)
Years in business 0.036*** 0.039*** 0.016
(0.011) (0.012) (0.018)
Alliance pressure 0.053 0.010 0.041*
(0.035) (0.038) (0.022)
Alliances’ market share 0.054*** 0.008 0.026**
(0.011) (0.014) (0.011)
National carriers’ tra¢c -0.010*** -0.013*** -0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
Capita GDP 0.048*** 0.058** 0.020
(0.018) (0.024) (0.051)
Observations 377 1713 374
Dependent variable: Alliance dummy (for the columns labeled “Logit" and “IV"), equal to
one if the observed airline participates any alliance and equal to zero otherwise; Alliance
choice (for the column labeled “Nested Logit").
Europe and US dummies included, but not reported.
Robust standard errors to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation in parenthesis, clustered
by country of airline’s registration and by year.
Coe¢cients *** statistically signi…cant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%.
Instruments for Passengers, Load factor and Alliances’ market share (assumed endogenous
in the IV model): population of the observed airline’s registration country, growth rate of
population, percentage of population between 15 and 64 years old, exchange rate with the
U$ dollar.
Note that in order to estimate the Nested Logit model, Stata requires to include, for each
chosen alternative representing the “genuine" observation, also the observations on all the
available alternatives. Therefore, by construction, the sample observations of the Nested
Logit model outnumber the sample observations of the other models.
27